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Abstract: Age-segregated incarceration – the separation of youth and 
adults in criminal custody – has established itself as a legal and human 
rights norm. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I argue that it suffers from 
five acute pitfalls. First, it perpetuates age essentialism – the historically 
recent belief that certain age groups are inherently different and must 
therefore abide by constrictive (and questionable) age norms. Second, 
age-segregated incarceration sanctions harshness and apathy toward the 
separated adults, whom it deems less vulnerable and less corrigible. 
Third, age segregation helps prison present itself as humane and effective, 
while also entrenching its punitive fixation with blame. Fourth, in 
conflating protection with age segregation, this practice harms youth: it 
downplays the risk they face from their peers and the prison staff, 
overlooks the support some imprisoned adults can offer, and occasions 
harmful practices such as solitary confinement. Finally, age segregation, 
in and beyond prison, has a long and ongoing history of suppressing 
disempowered communities by severing their intergenerational ties. 
Alternatives such as non-separate incarceration, age-specific penal 
reforms, or more refined segregation fail to address – and in some 
respects aggravate – these pitfalls. What is needed, instead, is to 
simultaneously undo essentialism and carcerality. 
 
Introduction 
Debates about youth justice focus on themes all too familiar to those in the field, such as 
rehabilitation versus retribution, welfarism versus justice, and enforcement versus 
violation of international legal standards (e.g., Muncie and Goldson 2012). Very rarely, if 
ever, is age-segregated incarceration – the separation of youth and adults in criminal 
custody – called into question.  
This taken-for-granted practice, however, is underpinned by two problematic 
conceptions: essentialism and carcerality. Crudely defined, essentialism is the belief that a 
type of person or thing, in this case a person within a certain age group, possesses an 
intrinsic, invariant, and constitutive nature. It is age essentialism that makes the separation 
of children or youth in certain sites appear natural and beneficial. Though ageism is often 
wrongly associated exclusively with older people (Hagestad and Unlenberg 2005), age 
essentialism is ageist toward youth (as well as adults, albeit differently, as shown shortly). 
                                                            
1  Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary University of London. For their very helpful comments, deep 
thanks are due to Tamar Birckhead, Barry Feld, Maayan Geva, Nicola Lacey, Daniel Monk, Leslie 
Moran, and Christine Piper. 
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As for carcerality, it encompasses the ideologies, social forces, and institutions positing 
imprisonment as a necessary response to transgressions. Combined, these conceptions 
render age-segregated incarceration seemingly self-evident and desirable, or at least the 
lesser of all possible evils.  
Within these prevailing parameters, the only conceivable alternatives are non-
segregated incarceration (incarcerating youth with adults) or youth-specific reforms. 
Illustrating this is the view – voiced by some proponents of a so-called toughness on youth 
crime – that young offenders should be imprisoned in adult facilities. While potentially 
eroding age segregation, this position remains well within carceral logic. No less 
problematic, albeit differently, is the ostensibly progressive claim that children and youth 
must never be held behind bars, regardless of whether they are separated from their adult 
counterparts. Here, the opposition to incarceration is reserved exclusively for the young, 
the implication being that for others – namely, adults – prison may not be out of the 
question. 
My aim in this chapter is to radically challenge both the practice of age-segregated 
incarceration itself and contemporary debates about it. The next section outlines the 
enshrining of this practice as a legal and human rights norm, at the international, regional, 
and domestic levels. In each of the sections that follow, I lay bare a hitherto overlooked 
pitfall of this norm. First, I argue that age-segregated incarceration reinforces the ageist, 
essentialist, and historically recent belief that “youth” (a term subject to varying definitions) 
are inherently different and, hence, must follow constrictive age norms. Second, age-
segregated incarceration portrays the separated adults as less vulnerable and less 
corrigible, and thus sanctions harshness and apathy toward them. Third, this practice 
legitimizes imprisonment, by entrenching its false image as humane and effective as well as 
its punitive preoccupation with blame. Fourth, in conflating protection with separation from 
adult inmates, age-segregated incarceration harms youth. It does so by downplaying the 
risk youth face from their peers and the prison staff, overlooking the support some 
imprisoned adults can offer, and occasioning harmful practices such as solitary 
confinement. Lastly, age-segregated incarceration, as well as comparable practices beyond 
prison, have a long and ongoing history of suppressing disempowered communities by 
breaking their intergenerational ties.  
Familiar alternatives, such as non-separate incarceration, age-specific reforms, or 
more refined segregation, fail to adequately address these pitfalls, and in some respects 
actually aggravate them. What is needed, instead, is to move past essentialism and 
carcerality. Given present space constraints, this chapter provides a rough outline of the 
issues in question, with the aim of stimulating further conversations and offering a more 
exhaustive analysis in the near future.  
 
The law of separation: Age-segregated incarceration as a legal and 
human rights norm 
Over the course of the 19th century, discrete youth justice systems started emerging in 
Western countries (May 1973; Magarey 1978; Platt 1977; Shore 2003). Since then, with 
very few exceptions, age-segregated incarceration has become the norm across the Global 
North, including jurisdictions where such separation is not legally mandatory (Siegel and 
Welsh 2017, 652). There remain instances of non-separation (Goldson and Kilkely 2013, 
358–360; Goldson and Muncie 2012, 52–54), but these are the exceptions. The United 
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States, for instance, generally prohibits “sight or sound contact” between young and adult 
inmates, defined as “any physical, clear visual, or verbal contact that is not brief and 
inadvertent” (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act 1974, §§ 103, 223). Non-
separation, though permitted in some US states in certain circumstances, has sharply 
decreased following recent reforms, and is expected to shrink further as a result of a 2018 
amendment to the federal law (Pilnik and Mistrett 2019, 6–8, 10). In England and Wales, 
pursuant to statute, youth are held separately in so-called Young Offender Institutions 
(currently about 73% of incarcerated youth), Secure Training Centers (18%), and Secure 
Children’s Homes (8%) (Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service 2019). 
 International law, too, now overwhelmingly enshrines age-segregated incarceration 
as the norm. Article 37(c) of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (hereinafter: 
CRC), the world’s most extensively ratified international treaty, formulates the separation 
principle in the following terms: “Every child deprived of liberty shall be … separated from 
adults unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so.”2  
Thus, though non-separation is permitted in exceptional and unspecified 
circumstances, as a default, age-segregated incarceration is presumed to be in children’s 
best interest. This perceived sanctity of the separation norm is further reinforced by the 
dominant human rights discourse. Instituted by the CRC, the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (2007, ¶ 104) has emphasized: “The permitted exception to the separation of 
children from adults stated in article 37(c) of CRC, ‘unless it is considered in the child’s best 
interests not to do so’, should be interpreted narrowly.” This was later reconfirmed by the 
UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (2015, ¶76): “Children should be appropriately 
separated in detention, including … those in conflict with the law, children awaiting trial and 
convicted children … Children detained under criminal legislation should never be detained 
together with adult detainees. … [T]he permitted exception … provided for in article 37 (c) 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child should be interpreted sensu stricto [i.e., 
narrowly].”  
So powerful is the separation norm that human rights organizations frequently 
quote Article 37(c) while entirely omitting its “best interests” exception. Such erasure of the 
non-separation exception is found in countless and varied human rights publications, 
including those of Amnesty International (2005, 6; 1997, 5), Human Rights Watch (2012), 
Save the Children (2005, 16), UNICEF and Terre des hommes (Albanian Ministry of Labor 
et al. 2010, 34, 100), the US-based Campaign for Youth Justice (2016), the Swiss Institut 
international des droits de l’enfant (2010), SOS Children’s Villages – Canada (2009), Thai 
Lawyers for Human Rights (2017), and the Scottish Institute for Residential Child Care 
(2005, 4). 
 Other international legal documents enshrine age-segregated incarceration even 
more categorically, with no exceptions whatsoever. Thus, Articles 10(2)(b) and 10(3) of the 
widely ratified International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) stipulate: 
“Accused juvenile persons shall be separated from adults … Juvenile offenders shall be 
segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal 
                                                            
2  Article 1 of the CRC defines “a child” as “every human being below the age of eighteen years 
unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier.” In addition, Article 9 
generally prohibits separating a child from her/his parents against her/his will without due 
legal process; yet, where such separation results from detention or imprisonment, all the Article 
requires (with certain caveats) is to inform the child or the family of the removed 
child’s/parent’s whereabouts. 
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status.” Equally equivocal are two UN General Assembly resolutions: the Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (adopted in 1955, revised in 2015, and since the 
revision called the “Nelson Mandela Rules”) and the Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice (1985, also known as the “Beijing Rules”). The former 
instructs, in Article 11(d): “Young prisoners shall be kept separate from adults” (this 
provision was not revised in 2015). The latter expands on this unreserved commitment to 
age segregation (¶¶ 13.4, 26.3): “Juveniles under detention pending trial shall be kept 
separate from adults and shall be detained in a separate institution or in a separate part of 
an institution also holding adults. … Juveniles in institutions shall be kept separate from 
adults and shall be detained in a separate institution or in a separate part of an institution 
also holding adults.” 
 In some documents, exceptions to the separation norm are allowed, but they are 
very specific and narrow. Under Article 77(4) of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (1977), children “arrested, detained or interned” in times of armed conflict 
“shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of adults, except where families are 
accommodated as family units.” Aside from members of the same family, no incarceration 
of children with adults is allowed. Beyond armed conflict, the Rules for the Protection of 
Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty (1990, ¶ 29), a UN General Assembly resolution known 
as the “Havana Rules,” permit a similar exception while adding to it: “In all detention 
facilities juveniles should be separated from adults, unless they are members of the same 
family. Under controlled conditions, juveniles may be brought together with carefully 
selected adults as part of a special programme that has been shown to be beneficial for the 
juveniles concerned.” 
 Age-segregated incarceration has been legally codified at the regional level as well. 
Thus, Article 17(2)(b) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990) 
requires party states to “ensure that children are separated from adults in their place of 
detention or imprisonment.” Slightly more flexible are the European Prison Rules (adopted 
by the Council of Europe in 1973 and last revised in 2006): “Children under the age of 18 
years should not be detained in a prison for adults … If children are nevertheless 
exceptionally held in such a prison there shall be special regulations that take account of 
their status and needs.” Relatedly, the American Convention on Human Rights (1969, Article 
5(5)), which has been ratified by most Central and South American countries and is also 
known as the “Pact of San José,” stipulates: “Minors while subject to criminal proceedings 
shall be separated from adults.” 
 The separation of youth and adults in criminal custody, then, is a potent norm at the 
international, regional, and (with very few exceptions) domestic levels. Exceptions to age-
segregated incarceration tend to be either narrowly carved, outright denied, or simply 
ignored. That instances of non-separation are relatively limited and roundly criticized helps 
further cement this as an otherwise uncontested norm. 
 
Pitfall 1: Reinforcing age essentialism 
The essentialist dichotomy between adults and children (or adolescents, or youth) reigns 
over contemporary social and legal thinking. Notwithstanding contradictions and 
ambiguities in this dichotomy, society envisages the archetypal adult criminal as competent, 
fully formed and, accordingly, as culpable and less susceptible to reform. In contrast, 
children and youth in conflict with the law are perceived as still developing and dependent, 
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easily influenced, relatively vulnerable and impulsive, lacking in knowledge, and, for these 
and other reasons, in greater need of protection and guidance. Age-segregated incarceration 
both manifests and contributes to this age essentialism.  
An extensive body of scholarship has challenged this conventional knowledge. 
Neither natural nor universal, the youth and adulthood envisioned by practices such as age-
segregated incarceration have been shown to be historically and culturally specific social 
creations. For instance, nearly a century ago, anthropologist Margaret Mead (1928) 
famously reported that adolescent rebellion – seen from Western eyes as a universal stage 
in human development – was largely absent in the Samoan Islands due to different local 
attitudes toward youth. Later anthropological studies have brought to light further 
intercultural disparity not only in the nature of childhood and youth but also, importantly, 
in their distinctiveness from adulthood (e.g., Montgomery 2008).  
Similarly, from the seminal if imperfect work of Philippe Ariès (1962) to more 
recent historical literature (e.g., Cunningham 2005), it has been argued that childhood and 
youth, as distinct stages separate from adulthood, are in many respects a modern invention. 
Pre-modern societies saw children working from an early age, mixing freely with adults, 
and consuming the same information. Age-specific legislation was rare and mostly 
unenforced at the time, and a person’s social status changed not through legal age 
thresholds but gradually or through rites of passage. There were no universal compulsory 
education laws, and schools, where they existed, consisted of mixed-age classrooms (e.g., 
Chudacoff 1989, 10, 16–17, 19; Lesko 2001, 120–122). Neither courts nor prisons 
segregated youth and adults, and, in 19th-century England, separation was initially based 
on the perceived character of the incarcerated individuals, the severity of their offense, and 
their criminal record (May 1973).  
Age essentialism operates to box people into rigid age categories and channel their 
life along constrictive age norms (Hagestad and Uhlenberg 2005; Lesko 2001; Chudacoff 
1989). Having now established itself as received wisdom, it is rarely accounted for. When 
justifications are provided, they often focus on traits associated with very young children. 
Yet, most countries exempt this age group from criminal responsibility (Morgan 2017), and 
such children are rarely incarcerated even where no statutory age of criminal responsibility 
exists. Therefore, not only are assumptions about the distinctness of very young children 
open for debate, they also bear little relevance to incarceration. Those typically separated 
from adults are youth specifically, not all children.  
Regarding youth, age essentialism – not unlike racism, patriarchy, and classism in 
past times – now finds support in mainstream science, with neuroscience increasingly at 
the forefront. However, the assumptions neurodevelopmental studies make about brain 
activity are contested and ever-changing, as is the equipment they use. Further, testing in a 
lab setting is limited, and countless variables that may influence the brain are ignored. Brain 
maps are also oversimplified to make them accessible to the public, in addition to being 
normalized for statistical “significance,” resulting in misrepresentation of the messy and 
complex data (Bessant 2008; Kelly 2012). More fundamentally, neurological development 
is affected by exposure to social experiences and information (Bennett and Baird 2006), 
which in modern times have become highly age-specific. Therefore, in a mixed-age society, 
cognitive development may well occur differently. 
Equally open to debate is the close association of young age with inexperience, 
incompetence, or vulnerability. Only in heavily age-stratified societies such as ours are these 
traits bound to be so closely intertwined. Insofar as youth lack certain social knowledge and 
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skills, this is largely the consequence of their exclusion from ostensibly adult-only activities 
and spheres (such as work and politics) and their relegation to age-homogeneous spaces 
(such as school). “Shielding” youth from the adult world, sometimes with the best of 
intentions, denies them valuable capacities and thus prolongs their vulnerability, 
dependence, and ignorance. As for the assumption (to the extent that it exists) that 
incarcerated youth are physically weaker than their adult counterparts, there is no reason 
to believe that all 17-year-olds, for example, are weaker than all 46-year-olds (quite the 
contrary, perhaps). Thus, it is not simply that differences dictate the division into youth and 
adults, but, to a large extent, the other way around. As youth came to be thought of as distinct 
from adults, so did their experiences, minds, and even bodies come to be shaped and 
regarded as different. It is society that attaches importance to, enhances, and sometimes 
even creates certain differences while deeming others meaningless (cf. James, Jenks, and 
Prout 1998, 147, 150–151). Comparable insights are widely accepted in gender, sexuality, 
race, and disability studies. 
 
Pitfall 2: Sanctioning harshness and apathy toward adults 
Debates over youth imprisonment tend to consider only its impact on youth (an issue 
indeed examined later in this chapter). Yet, it is adults, no less than youth, whom age-
segregated incarceration targets. By associating incarcerated youth with vulnerability, 
plasticity, and the need for special protection, what age segregation does is signal that those 
at the other side are more dangerous, culpable, and incorrigible. Consequently, through 
essentialism, age segregation makes harshness and apathy toward imprisoned adults 
appear natural, obvious, and hence requiring little if any justification. Once separated, adults 
in prison can be denied protections reserved exclusively for youth. Notwithstanding 
differences across time and place in the scope and content of these protections, the overall 
message tends to be similar: incarcerated adults are less deserving of society’s compassion 
and leniency.  
In addition to their adult status, imprisoned adults are predominantly men, from 
disempowered and marginalized socioeconomic, ethnic, racial, and national groups (e.g., 
Coyle et al. 2016). As such, they are commonly the targets not only of age essentialism but 
also of sexism,3 classism, and racism, all of which potentially exacerbate prejudice toward 
them. Admittedly, most of these demographic features apply to incarcerated youth as well 
(e.g., Burns Institute for Youth Justice Fairness & Equity 2016; Goldson and Muncie 2012, 
54–55). Yet, their supposedly distinguishing characteristic – their young age – is commonly 
associated with relative innocence, is considered a mitigating factor (see Viterbo 2012a, 
142–144, 146, 154 for exceptions), and hence invites relative leniency, at least rhetorically. 
In actuality, not all youth in conflict with the law are treated leniently: in the United States, 
for example, the recent decline in youth incarceration rates has been accompanied by a 
continued and even growing overrepresentation of racial and ethnic minority youth 
(Rovner 2017; Burns Institute for Youth Justice Fairness & Equity 2016).  
Had adults not been locked up separately, their prison conditions would have 
directly impacted youth as well and, for this reason, may have garnered greater social 
concern. Conversely, age-segregated incarceration might make it easier for state authorities 
to worsen the conditions of imprisoned adults with relatively little public outcry. This is no 
                                                            
3  Indeed, when imprisoned women are concerned, some countries view incarceration with them 
as beneficial for girls (e.g., UNICEF 2009, 13). 
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mere hypothetical eventuality. There is evidence of youth-specific prison reforms, including 
age segregation, facilitating a steady erosion in adult inmates’ rights as well as the 
introduction of new adult-focused restrictions (Viterbo 2018, 771, 777–779, 783). 
Far from being exclusive to age-segregated incarceration, the legitimation of 
harshness toward adults is intrinsic to modern child law and policy.4 To mention but a few 
examples, in international humanitarian legal discourse, “women and children” are often a 
shorthand for civilians, while adult male civilians are overlooked. This framing disregards 
men’s unique vulnerabilities in armed conflict and, at times, has even paved the way for 
their indiscriminate targeting by the belligerent parties (Carpenter 2006). The privileging 
of children in humanitarian aid campaigns likewise disenfranchises adults by deeming them 
less deserving of empathy and assistance (Burman 1994). Similarly, the rhetoric of an 
endangered childhood innocence has, in some contexts, repeatedly served to expand the 
policing and incarceration of purportedly dangerous adults (Meiners 2016). Some attempts 
at redesigning family law courts in a “child-sensitive” fashion, too, have drawn an antithesis 
between innocent children, who are assumed to need protection, and adults in conflict with 
the law (parents or others), who are portrayed as culpable criminals deserving 
imprisonment (Ananth 2014). It is probably no coincidence that across these contexts, as in 
age-segregated incarceration, the adults bearing the brunt are often from “othered” and 
disempowered groups. 
Time and again, supposedly progressive critics of the youth justice system play into 
society’s abandonment of incarcerated adults. Some of them do so while decrying 
insufficient age segregation, as exemplified by an op-ed titled “Children, even teenagers, 
don’t belong in adult jails” (Washington Post editorial board 2013). The piece rehashes 
essentialist claims about the reduced capacity of youth for moral reasoning, impulse control, 
and mastery over their environment, and then adds: “There is also more hope of 
rehabilitating young offenders. … When minors are thrown into adult jails and prisons, … 
they don’t get the structure and educational opportunities necessary for growth or 
rehabilitation. They are also extremely vulnerable to harm.” The implication is that adults, 
unlike children, do belong behind bars, that they are relatively hopeless, and that they 
deserve less support and protection.  
Other youth justice reforms leave intact the mistreatment of incarcerated adults by, 
for instance, banning solitary confinement only for youth (Equal Justice Initiative 2016) or 
ensuring that no prisoner under the age of 18 is legally considered an adult (Kelly 2018). 
Calls to abolish youth imprisonment exhibit similar sentiments. A Guardian op-ed titled 
“Child prisons are beyond reform – it's time to stop jailing young people” thus maintains: 
“Desperate levels of child suffering combined with terrible outcomes [of youth 
incarceration] should lead us all to reject imprisonment” (Willow 2018). Far from rejecting 
imprisonment, however, the piece reserves its compassion exclusively for youth. In so 
doing, it effectively condones the damaging incarceration of those making up the 
overwhelming majority of the prison population: adults. Rather than trickling into adult 
incarceration, the reforms advocated by self-identified progressives thus cement age 
differentiation. This ubiquitous approach figures centrally in academic studies (e.g., 
Bowman 2018), journalistic books (e.g., Bernstein 2014), and NGO publications (e.g., Equal 
                                                            
4  At the same time, some child-related laws and policies also enable various forms of harshness 
toward children, such as physical chastisement, curfews, and, as discussed later, so-called 
“status offenses.” 
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Justice Initiative 2017). This leads me directly to the next pitfall of age-segregated 
incarceration: its legitimation of incarceration.  
 
Pitfall 3: Legitimizing incarceration 
As long argued by the prison abolition movement, incarceration is irredeemably 
problematic. The endemic violence in prisons, abolitionists argue, stems first and foremost 
from the punitiveness and violence inherent to incarceration itself (often compounded by 
staff violence), not from the imprisoned population – most of whom are there for physically 
nonviolent crime, primarily property and drug offenses. Further, imprisonment has 
repeatedly proven to be neither effective in discouraging harmful behaviour nor in 
preventing reoffending. Incarceration and policing are also damaging to the public, socially 
and economically, among other reasons because their high costs come at the expense of 
funding for welfare, healthcare, education, housing, and other imperative areas. For these 
and other reasons, prison abolitionists have pressed for non-punitive responses to harm, in 
which the focus is on healing and, by addressing root causes, prevention. Such alternatives, 
it has been argued, must be flexible and context-specific, with possible examples including 
various forms of restorative justice, anti-poverty policies, community-based restitution 
initiatives, affordable housing, free and high-quality healthcare and education, recreational 
projects, decriminalizing drug use, and empowering marginalized communities (Goldman 
1910; Hulsman 1991; Davis 2003; Lamble 2011). 
 In order to understand the role age-segregated incarceration plays in this regard, 
one must recognise the ties it encapsulates between imprisonment and reform. The genesis 
of prison was in attempts to reform punishment: to place lawbreakers behind bars as a more 
humane substitute for castigating and torturing them in public (Foucault 1995, 3–31; Davis 
2003, 40–42). As criminal punishment became less publicly visible, so did its violence 
become more deniable (Kahn 2008, 2–3). Against this backdrop, age-segregated 
incarceration emerged. As noted earlier, youth were initially tried and imprisoned with 
adults, but the transformation of childhood into a separate social realm entailed age 
segregation within the criminal legal system. Age segregation thus served as a reform 
enabling prison to maintain its false image as a humane, effective, and hence acceptable 
solution to transgressions.  
Rather than undermining carceral thinking, then, separate incarceration entrenches 
it, making prison more immune to abolition. This problem is by no means unique to age 
segregation. Comparable issues arise from separating inmates based on gender or sexual 
identity, as well as from attempts at making prisons “responsive” to their needs. Such 
measures, some abolitionists have argued, occasion new – and sometimes more far-
reaching – forms of punishment, while also jeopardizing inmates who do not fit into the 
binaries imposed on them (Spade 2011; Shaylor 2008; Carlton and Russell 2018; Davis 
2003, 60–83).  
There is yet another sense in which age segregation lends legitimacy to 
incarceration. By dividing inmates on grounds including their perceived culpability, it feeds 
into the punitive fixation with blame – a fixation with identifying and distinguishing 
between the blameworthy and those deemed less blameworthy (cf. Ananth 2014; Meiners 
2016). Indeed, age has come to dictate both culpability and the spatial arrangement of 
prison. On its one side, age-segregated incarceration places adults, whose purported 
maturity and competence is said to render them fully culpable, and on its other side youth, 
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who are supposedly unknowing, undeveloped, impressionable, and hence less culpable. In 
this respect, age-based separation and differentiation epitomize the preoccupation of 
modern penality not simply with acts (offenses) but with the identities, minds, and bodies 
of those classified as offenders (Foucault 1995, 17–27, 170–183, 269; Platt 1977; May 
1973).  
Regrettably, even radical proposals to abolish youth courts have merely suggested 
substituting them with unified courts, thereby neither questioning imprisonment generally 
nor age-segregated incarceration specifically (Ainsworth 1991, 1995; Feld 1997). My 
argument here, in contrast, is that the solution lies neither in non-segregated incarceration 
nor in more refined segregation. Only within a carceral logic are these the only imaginable 
options. Instead of readjusting state violence, a wholesale rethinking of both carcerality and 
age essentialism is necessary.  
 
Pitfall 4: Harming youth 
Age-segregated incarceration claims to protect youth. Yet, in associating protection with 
separation from the adult inmates, it ends up putting incarcerated youth at risk, in three key 
respects. First, the conflation of protection with age segregation downplays the risk young 
inmates face from one another. Perhaps for this reason, among others, there has been 
relatively little research into youth-on-youth abuse and aggression in prison (Monks et al. 
2009, 150–151; Liefaard et al. 2014, 6; Klatt et al. 2016, 728). To the extent available, self-
reported data from carceral facilities for youth in a variety of countries indicates a high level 
of peer abuse and violence (e.g., Davidson-Arad et al. 2009, 260–261, 267–269 and the 
sources cited there; Bartollas et al. 1976; Liefaard et al. 2014, 7–9; Klatt et al. 2016, 728, 
734). Advocates of age segregation may bemoan this reality but insist that incarceration 
with adults would expose youth to even greater harm. In actuality, studies comparing the 
experience of youth incarcerated in youth and adult facilities are scarce (Ng et al. 2012, 462–
463, 466) and are also, at best, inconclusive.  
One widely cited study interviewed a few dozen youth imprisoned for serious 
physically violent offenses in the United States. It found that those in adult prisons, where 
there was only partial age segregation, reported higher assault rates than those in youth 
facilities (Forst et al. 1989). However, according to several other studies, incarcerated youth 
are involved in more violence toward other inmates, as well as more disciplinary infractions 
and assaults on staff, compared with their adult counterparts (McShane and Williams 1989; 
MacKenzie 1987; Kupchik 2007, 248). Similarly, youth facilities in the United Kingdom were 
recently reported to have higher violence rates than any adult prison (Allison 2014). At the 
same time, other studies found no significant correlation between inmates’ age and the 
perpetration of prison violence (Klatt et al. 2016, 737).  
Where inmate-on-inmate violence and abuse rates do vary between youth and adult 
facilities, this may stem not from the existence or lack of age segregation, but from other 
distinguishing features of youth prisons. Such features sometimes include higher staff-per-
inmate ratios, smaller facilities, differences in the criminal profile of the incarcerated youth, 
and a greater professed commitment to treatment and rehabilitation (Bishop 2000, 139–
140; Kupchik 2007, 259–263; Birckhead 2015, 59). It is therefore impossible to isolate the 
effects of age segregation from other factors. And even if this were possible, to generalize 
about age-segregated incarceration is to make two problematic assumptions: one, an 
essentialist assumption that all youth (and adults) across time and space are one and the 
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same; the other, a context-insensitive assumption that age segregation would have similar 
effects in vastly different circumstances. 
 Second, in associating risk with imprisoned adults, age segregation dangerously 
mischaracterizes the prison’s adult population. In the process, it neglects both the violence 
youth face from some adults in prison and the support other adults can offer. Regarding 
violence from adult inmates, age segregation disregards the reality, mentioned previously, 
that only a small minority of them – who at any rate are sometimes held in separate facilities 
or wings – actually committed physically violent offenses (and many of them have an 
otherwise nonviolent record). Also passed over, perhaps conveniently, is the risk frequently 
posed by other adults: the prison staff, whose abuse and violence toward inmates (youth 
and adults) has been documented on countless occasions (e.g., Goldson and Muncie 2012, 
55–56 and the sources cited there; Miller et al. 2017; Willow 2018). Further, the separation 
of ostensibly different inmate groups fails to take into account the support, solidarity, care, 
and protection they sometimes offer one another (e.g., Arkles 2009, 527–536 and the 
sources cited there; Shaylor 1998, 390, 399–400). Such assistance is certainly possible 
between adults and youth, on the rare occasions that they are incarcerated together (e.g., 
Viterbo 2012b, 128, 132–134; 2018, 779–782). Unwittingly or not, these various blind spots 
of age-segregated incarceration place imprisoned populations at greater risk, physically and 
mentally.  
 Third, to ensure age segregation, prison staff occasionally resort to harmful 
practices, such as solitary confinement – some forms of which, incidentally, are also referred 
to as “segregation.” Where incarcerated youth cannot be separated from adults by other 
means, they have repeatedly been placed in solitary confinement. This has occurred in 
different parts of the globe, on numerous occasions, and often for long periods of time (UN 
Special Rapporteur on Torture 2011, ¶ 66; Viterbo 2012b, 127; Birckhead 2015, 4, 20, 37–
38, 42, 75 and the sources cited there; Equal Justice Initiative 2017, 13). In addition to its 
grave psychological effects, solitary confinement cuts off the inmate from crucial sources of 
support and information, and can also facilitate uninterrupted staff abuse (e.g., Arkles 2009, 
537–542, 550, 553; Dolovich 2011, 3–4). Thus, in the name of protection, the commitment 
to age segregation yet again begets greater harm. A similar protective rationale, it is worth 
noting, has also been used to justify placing LGBTQI and women inmates in solitary 
confinement (Arkles 2009, 545, 550, 554–555; Dolovich 2011, 3; Lamble 2011, 244). This, 
as I pointed out earlier, is not the only troubling parallel between the effects of segregation 
on youth and other incarcerated groups. Hence, it is identity-based segregation generally 
that requires dismantling, not solely age segregation. 
The harm inflicted on youth is yet another pitfall age-segregated incarceration 
shares with other forms of age segregation and differentiation. For example, youth courts – 
the face of age-segregated adjudication – often deny young defendants important rights that 
are granted in adult criminal courts (e.g., Feld 2017; Howard League for Penal Reform 2016; 
Ainsworth 1991). The norm of closing youth hearings is likewise problematic. As critics 
have observed, closed hearings might shield the youth court from scrutiny more than they 
protect young defendants, particularly given the less deleterious alternatives available (e.g., 
Geis 1957; Trasen 1995). A similarly questionable form of age differentiation, in some 
countries, is charging youth with “status offenses” – conduct that would not be illegal for 
adults, such as skipping school and running away (e.g., Coalition for Juvenile Justice 2015). 
Beyond the youth justice context, the list of examples (such as the separation of school from 
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work) could go on. The harm caused by age-segregated incarceration, then, is but a 
symptom of a broader problem. 
 
Pitfall 5: Fragmenting disempowered communities 
A final pitfall of age-segregated incarceration is its use to suppress disempowered or 
persecuted communities by breaking their intergenerational ties. A recent case in point 
concerns the thousands of noncitizen Palestinian political prisoners, including hundreds of 
youth, whom Israel puts behind bars every year.5 Over the years, Israel has increasingly 
sought to fragment Palestinian territory and society. This has recently included segregating 
Palestinian political prisoners – whose collective endeavours Israel has long decried – based 
on their regions of residence, as well as cracking down on their study groups and barring 
them from electing central representatives. Palestinian youth and adult inmates, who until 
the first decade of the century were mostly held together, are also now systematically 
separated – a change presented by Israeli authorities as both consistent with international 
law and in Palestinian youth’s “best interests.” The Israeli judiciary pushed for age 
segregation as a means to prevent the exposure of Palestinian youth “to . . . [the older] 
prisoners’ ideologies” by removing them from “adults who wished to capture [their] … soul.” 
However, Palestinian youth’s testimonies and other sources suggest that, prior to their 
separation, the incarcerated adults provided them with invaluable care and support. These 
adults also represented their concerns to the Israeli prison authorities and, given Israel’s 
frequent denial of family prison visits, could offer the closest substitute for parental care. 
Moreover, age segregation has left Palestinian youth less protected against the abuse they 
commonly report suffering at the hands of the Israeli prison and security staff. Human rights 
organizations, possibly due to their enshrining of age-segregated incarceration, tended to 
criticize Israel for not separating incarcerated Palestinian youth, and mostly started 
doubting the desirability of such separation only after the fact (Viterbo 2018, 766–785). 
Broader lessons, it seems, have yet to be learned, judging by criticism recently voiced by the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict: “well-
established principles of detention are … [being] overlooked in the context of armed conflict 
…, [including] children … being held together with adults” (Zerrougui 2016, ¶ 19). 
 Another contemporary example is to be found in China’s north-west Xinjiang 
region.6 For decades, the Chinese government has been targeting and closely surveilling 
Uyghurs and other Muslims in Xinjiang to ensure their loyalty to the state and assimilation 
into the Han-dominated society. Their private lives have been closely monitored, national 
expression has been censored, religious activities have been criminalized and persecuted, 
and, as a complementary measure, Chinese language and culture education has been 
forcefully promoted (Roberts 2018). In recent years, China has reportedly subjected 
Xinjiang’s Muslim populations to age segregation as well. Hundreds of thousands and 
possibly even 1.5 million adults, it is estimated, have been preemptively and extrajudicially 
placed in so-called “re-education” internment camps. “Re-educating these people,” a 
Chinese official has explained, “is like spraying chemicals on the crops. That is why it is a 
general re-education, not limited to a few people.” Government publications have warned 
                                                            
5  For background information, see Ben-Naftali et al. (2018, 1–4, 130–133, 264–267, 383–388). 
6  Juxtaposing these two parts of the world is not unheard of: Chinese scholar and dissident Wang 
Lixiong once warned of an “interminable ethnic war” in Xinjiang amounting to a 
“Palestinization” of the region (Finley 2019). 
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that adults affected by “extremist thought” instill in their children animosity toward non-
Muslim groups and Han culture. Having interned such adults, China has removed many of 
their children and placed them in securitized and centralized education facilities, where it 
claims they can develop more “open personalities” and improve their Chinese skills. A staff 
member of one such facility has couched these measures in pedagogical terms: “I tell the 
children: ‘Your parents and you all alike are studying’” (Zenz 2019a, 2019b). 
 Such use of age-segregated incarceration shares parallels with other forms of 
generational segregation. Modern child law partly developed to remove children from 
perceived problem groups and “civilize” them away from allegedly depraved or unfit 
parents, often in the name of national interests. Among those thus treated were hundreds 
of thousands of Indigenous children in Australia, Canada, and the United States, who were 
placed in special boarding schools (commonly described by the children as prison-like) or 
put up for adoption. Proponents depicted such segregation as salvaging Indigenous children 
from “deleterious influences” and turning them into “honorable, useful, happy citizens.” In 
North America, state authorities also saw generational segregation as a counterinsurgency 
measure: “It is unlikely,” one official argued, “that any Tribe … would give trouble of a 
serious nature … whose members had children completely under Government control” 
(Viterbo 2012b, 135–138; 2017, 687–688, 701–709, 721–722). Others subjected to similar 
segregation include Andamanese tribes in British colonial India (Sen 1999, 757–766), the 
Yenish (often described as “gypsies”) in 1970s Switzerland, “mixed-race” families in both 
French colonial Morocco and the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia), the Inuit in Danish-
ruled Greenland in the 1950s, impoverished immigrants in the 19th–20th-century United 
States, non-European Jewish immigrants in 1950s Israel, and Christians in the Ottoman-
ruled Balkans. To this could be added other forms of generational segregation in modern 
times, including child emigration and transnational child adoption programs (Viterbo 2017, 
723–728).  
 Parallels can also be drawn to elements of incarceration other than the separation 
of incarcerated youth. Specifically, many of the men in prison – who, as I have noted, are 
overwhelmingly poor, non-white, or noncitizens – are fathers. Incarceration cuts them off 
from their children, while also further impoverishing their families. Thus contextualized, 
age-segregated incarceration lies at the juncture of two practices – age segregation on the 
one hand and incarceration on the other – each of which has operated to drive a 
generational wedge in disempowered and persecuted populations. 
 
Conclusion 
Age-segregated incarceration has established itself as an undisputed social, legal, and 
human rights norm. Its pitfalls, therefore, have so far largely escaped critical notice, 
including from youth justice critics. This chapter has brought to light five such interrelated 
pitfalls.  
First, age-segregated incarceration buttresses age essentialism, which boxes people 
into constrictive and historically specific categories based on dubious assumptions. Second, 
in attributing to imprisoned youth greater corrigibility and vulnerability, age-segregated 
incarceration signals that their adult counterparts are less deserving of compassion and 
leniency. Thus, these separated adults can more easily be denied youth-only protections and 
treated harshly, with relatively little public outcry. A third pitfall is the legitimation of 
incarceration. Through age segregation, prison presents itself as humane and effective, 
Viterbo, The Pitfalls of Separating Youth in Prison: A Critique of Age-Segregated Incarceration  
13 
 
while also maintaining its punitive fixation with blame. Fourth, in the name of protection, 
age-segregated incarceration harms youth. It downplays the risk posed by their peers and 
the prison staff, neglects the support they can receive from some imprisoned adults, and has 
led to harmful practices such as solitary confinement. Finally, age segregation, in and 
beyond prison, has long served as a means to suppress disempowered communities by 
severing their intergenerational ties. This occurred, and is still occurring, across different 
parts of the world. 
A more in-depth analysis of these pitfalls exceeds the scope and space constraints 
of this chapter, as does an exploration of possible alternatives to age-segregated 
incarceration. I intend to delve into these issues soon. This chapter is aimed to stimulate 
further conversations, while bringing into dialogue childhood studies, prison abolitionism, 
youth justice, and other ways of thinking. At this stage, suffice it to reiterate that non-
separate imprisonment ought not be the only conceivable alternative. Nor does the solution 
lie in age-specific penal reforms, more refined separation, or non-carceral age segregation. 
With the pitfalls of age-segregated incarceration now in plain sight, the need arises for more 
imaginative alternatives, by moving past essentialism and carcerality. This enterprise is as 
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